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From La Mettrie‖s Voluptuous Man Machine to The Per-
verse Core of Psychology 
Abstract 
 
Julien Offray La Mettrie (1709-1751) solved the problem of Cartesian dualism by 
denying the res cogitans any substance as such. He thus provided science with a 
basic paradigm which is still respected today. For La Mettrie, all aspects of the soul 
have to be considered as aspects of the res extensa: man is a machine. However, 
the emptying of the res cogito is not without a remainder. A zero level of subjec-
tivity is left behind. This paper argues that it is through this remainder that mod-
ern subjectivity is structurally linked to the academic and, moreover, psychologi-
cal gaze. It is further argued that the paradoxes of this modern stance are what 
prompt La Mettrie to put forward his voluptuous subject, his attempt to escape 
the abyss of the zero-level of subjectivity. In this way, La Mettrie‖s naturalized and 
scientific hedonism contains the germs of Marquis de Sade‖s appropriation of the 
Enlightenment project. Hence this paper attempts to explore the extent to which 
La Mettrie‖s L’homme machine, a key text in 18th century materialism, has lead to a 
perverse disposition in the modern psy-sciences. 
 
Introduction 
18th century materialism has had decisive bearings on today‖s human sciences, albeit if 
only in Julien Offray de La Mettrie‖s idea of ascribing societal authority to scientists. For 
La Mettrie it was, for example, preferable if only the top physicians were eligible to be-
come judges.1 We can see a more recent example of the idea that science should bypass 
the law and politics in an official APA-article entitled “Wanted: politics-free, science-
                                                     
 
 




based education.”2 Murray advances the idea that politically motivated, fad-of-the-
month educational practices should be replaced by educational techniques grounded in 
solid scientific evidence. It is a plea to keep the politicians out of what should be under-
stood as the proper domain of the psy-experts. There appears to be an assumption here 
that psy-experts have some sort of privileged knowledge concerning how we should be 
educated, an assumption which effectively suggests that, like Plato‖s philosopher kings, 
the psy-experts know what the good life would be and how to attain it. Following this 
Platonic reasoning, it is easy imagine a state wherein each science would claim jurisdic-
tion over its specific terrain, leaving no proper place for the political as such. Such a 
movement is then effectively the replacement of democracy with an oligarchy of sup-
posed experts. 
How should we understand this suggestion that knowledge of the good life has mi-
grated from religious and ethical discourses and found a new haven in the psy-
sciences?3 Mainstream psychology in particular plays a leading role in this; remember 
George Millers‖ well known presidential address to the American Psychological Associa-
tion on “psychology as a means of promoting human welfare.”4 This position is enforced 
even more today as psychology increasingly assumes the task of translating and imple-
menting knowledge from the hard sciences concerning our neuro-biochemical determi-
nations. It is interesting to turn to pop-psychology as the place where the fundamental 
paradoxes of the psy-sciences‖ ambition to promote human welfare is often laid bare. In 
pop-psychology the expert tells you what makes you tick and gives you tips and tricks 
to help you to manage and to overcome these neuro-biochemical determinations (or at 
least the translations psychology has given to them). In this way, pop-psychology places 
the so called layman in a position outside and beyond everything that makes him tick: 
“Change your nature. Build courage, passion, joy and optimism”, thus reads the 
March/April, 2008 cover of Psychology Today. Is the position induced not similar to some 
paranormal out-of-body-experience: step outside yourself and have a look at yourself 
through the gaze of psychology? “With a little experimentation,” Kathleen McGowan 
writes in Psychology Today, “the ornery and bleak can reshape their temperaments and 
inject pluck and passion into their lives.”5 The layman is thus prompted to take the posi-
                                                     
 
 
2 B. Murray, "Wanted: politics-free, science-based education," Monitor on psychology 33, no. 8 (2002). 
3 By the psy-sciences I mean those sciences which form the backbone of what the so called psy-complex (D. 
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5 K. McGowan, "Second Nature.," Psychology Today Magazine, Mar/Apr 2008. 
 tion of the scientist, the objective and neutral position from which things can be as-
sessed as they are, independent of our consciousness. But one should not move too rap-
idly to dismiss pop-psychology as having nothing to do with genuine, academic psy-
chology, as if the psychologization processes would be the mere effect of the unfortu-
nate popularization of psychology. One should, rather, ask if the phenomenon of psy-
chologization does not point to something fundamental and structural, not only in psy-
chology, but in the whole domain of the sciences. The question thus is: what kind of sub-
jectivity does our thoroughly scientified world entail? Is the adoption of the psychologi-
cal gaze, which transcends one‖s presupposed embedded position, not the very trade-
mark of Western modernity as a whole?  
Take for example G. K. Chesterton who defined the trick of Christianity in this way: 
“you want to enjoy the pagan dream of pleasurable life without paying the price of mel-
ancholic sadness for it? Choose Christianity!”6 This is clearly a modern meta-discourse 
on Christianity. Considering it a trick to regain the pagan pleasurable life, Chesteron 
actually closes down the path of a “natural,” direct belief and sketches a pragmatic and 
calculated, always aware of itself, modern belief. Does this “perverse” trick, as Žižek 
calls it, not return today in the call to “choose science, choose psychology!”? In today‖s 
psychologized culture, the assumption is that science can provide knowledge of the 
good and pleasurable life: psychology depicts the pre-modern psychological man that you 
are (driven by selfish genes, tribal-like attachments, and learned cognitive patterns) so 
that you, as a modern, scientifically informed, meta-psychological man, can deal with 
that. The fundamental problem however is that this academic meta-gaze cannot simply 
be switched off while we re-enter life itself. Furthermore, isn‖t the claim of knowledge 
of the good life—knowledge of jouissance in Lacanian terms—not the stance of the per-
vert? The pervert is he who knows how to enjoy and, reducing himself to an instrument 
of that knowledge, claims to be in the position to let others access that special enjoy-
ment. As such, psychology‖s stance of assuming it can open up the path to happiness 
disavows a kind of ethical zero-level which comes to light with Chesteron. For the mod-
ern subject, paganism and a non-reflexive Christianity are both historical, closed-down 
paths, wherein the subject finds itself in some kind of no-man‖s land. Modernity con-
cerns a point beyond the pagan melancholic sadness and beyond any naïve and direct 
Christian bargaining with it. It leads to a kind of zero-level of subjectivity, the de-
subjectivization of man, looking upon himself, trying to assume this knowledge which 
reveals him as he really is. And that knowledge is uncanny and horrifying, to paraphrase 
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Žižek, it dispossesses the subject and reduces her or him to a puppet-like level beyond 
dignity and freedom.7  
Isn‖t this exactly the deadlock pop-psychology tries to bypass by choosing the Ches-
tertonian solution? The psy-expert knows how things work and, therefore, knows the 
tricks necessary to attain a pleasurable life? Think for example about the idea of using 
“positive reinforcement” to enhance the children‖s self-image; praise positive behaviour 
and ignore negative behaviour, that will do the trick. Some versions of psychoanalysis 
have fallen into the same trap; commenting on today‖s loss of paternal authority, I once 
heard an (atheist) psychoanalyst argue that we should educate our children in a Chris-
tian framework in order to re-introduce a Supreme Father Being into the psychic im-
agery. Both stances amount to the suggestion that you can use tricks, that you can lure 
yourself and others, or in Lacanian terms, that you can fool and dupe the Big Other.  
If, in Lacanian theory, this attempt to fool the Other distinguishes the position of the 
pervert, then the question becomes whether or not this perverse position runs through 
the history of the sciences and, in particular, the psy-sciences? In this paper, I will at-
tempt to trace this back to Julien D‖Offray De La Mettrie. His L’homme machine (Man Ma-
chine; of 1747, a key text in 18th century materialism, can be said to carry the germs of 
the perverse disposition of the modern psy-sciences. In short, La Mettrie solved the 
problem of Cartesian dualism by denying the res cogitans any substance as such. He thus 
provided science with a basic paradigm which is still respected today.8 For La Mettrie, all 
aspects of the soul have to be considered as aspects of the res extensa. Man is a machine; 
thinking, willing, and feeling are but bodily reactions and functions. What we call the 
soul is actually material and thus observable in the nerves and brain. La Mettrie ground-
ed his argument in an appeal to future research. He considered it but a matter of time 
before our knowledge and technical abilities would be refined enough to prove scientifi-
cally that the soul is but a function of the body. A very modern academic stance indeed, 
one we might compare to the history of a construct like ADHD. Where the cluster of 
phenomena now described as ADHD was originally seen as being caused by Minimal 
Brain Damage, it was then located as Minimal Brain Dysfunction because no lesions 
were found and then, finally, it was located as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, 
a firmly behavioral description but one which still promises the location of an organic 
etiology. ADHD and other similar constructs such as CFS (Chronic Fatigue Syndrome) or 
Tourette Syndrome thus are in line with the La Mettrian stance of asserting man as ex-
clusively res extensa and postponing the proof of this in some indefinite future. 
                                                     
 
 
7 S. Žižek, The plague of fantasies: 8. 
8 M. De Kesel, "There is no ethics of the real," in International Conference Rhetoric, Politics, Ethics (Ghent 
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 La Mettrie provided a decisive redefinition of modern subjectivity and his notion of 
the Man Machine still haunts us today. We can see this, for example, in the way that 
pop-psychology, which we might understand as the breach and overflow of academic 
psychology, confronts us with a strange automaton, a homunculus which we are both 
supposed to be and with whom we are supposed to deal and bargain. In this paper I will 
show that the psy-sciences, while denying the paradoxes inherent in this imagery, are 
always, structurally, at risk of sliding into the discourse of the pervert insofar as they 
still, implicitly endorse the very position they deny. First I will argue that La Mettrie‖s 
attempt to deal with the paradoxes of the emerging modern subjectivity pushes him to 
put forward a voluptuous subject. Then I will explore how his naturalized and scientifical-
ly informed Epicureanism is to be regarded in relation to Marquis de Sade‖s appropria-
tion of the Enlightenment project. Finally, I will question the extent to which La 
Mettrie‖s L’homme machine has lead to a perverse disposition of the modern psy-sciences. 
La Mettrie’s Solution to Cartesian Dualism: Voluptuousness 
It is perhaps useful to start with a question. Who are we that we need so much psychol-
ogy? Jacques Claes argues that psychology emerged because there was a need to recon-
nect man with a receding world.9 Before the Enlightenment, man lived in a world where 
God was present in every thing, whether living or not. This emanation, God as the com-
mon denominator, mediated man‖s presence, his being in the world. When, in the Re-
naissance, the word psychology was coined—traditionally attributed to Rudolf Goclenius 
(1547-1628)—something must have changed. As Claes puts it; through a gradual process 
of secularisation man became more and more disentangled from the world, and it is 
there that psychology emerged as the mediator, the means to position man once again 
in a meaningful relation with the world.10 Can we not understand Descartes‖ cogito in the 
same way, as an attempt to redefine man against the background of a progressive objec-
tification of both man and his world by the emerging sciences? Descartes accepted that 
God was completely cut loose from the world, but he still needed Him as the keystone 
for his new, modern conceptualisation of the subject. God guaranteed the link between 
man (res cogito) and the world (res extensa). La Mettrie pushes this further by denying the 
res cogito any substance in itself. Modern man had to acknowledge that even his doubt-
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ing and thinking were but aspects of the material, secularized world. Here God loses his 
function.  
The paradox, already present in La Mettrie, is that drawing the cogito into the res ex-
tensa cannot be achieved without a remainder. As Marc De Kesel argues, La Mettrie‖s 
operation (and with it, the whole of modern science) of stripping the subject of all of its 
contents, leaves behind an emptied, non-substantial space where once the subject was. 
This zero level is precisely the neutral and objective point outside the subject which 
objective science presupposes when engaging in scientific research.11 This objective 
gaze, which has become the norm for science, is the result of La Mettrie‖s operation 
which, as De Kesel writes, is the result of trying to purify the scientific point of view of 
its subjective enmeshments.12 It is this point that pop-psychology appeals to and it is 
this that leads to a kind of redoubling of the subject. The advent of modernity runs par-
allel with the advent of psychology and, with it, the need for the psychological gaze in 
order to see oneself. And this psychologization posits the modern subject as an academ-
ic subject. Psychologization illustrates how La Mettrie‖s reduction cannot but reaffirm 
the Cartesian cogito, albeit it as an empty point, the zero level of subjectivity from which 
man looks upon himself.  
Jacques Lacan affirms La Mettrie‖s stance of understanding man as a machine. For La-
can, La Mettrie was one of the first to understand that with the emergence of science we 
also see the emergence of the symbolic, mathematized body.13 Since the Enlightenment, 
the language of science and mathematics has become the symbolic framework for mod-
ern man. La Mettrie‖s Machine Man is precisely an attempt to grasp this fact. It is a tena-
cious mistake to understand La Mettrie as an exponent of mechanistic materialism.14 La 
Mettrie is not the supreme materialist he is often taken to be.15 Reading Machine Man, it 
rapidly becomes clear that what we are being presented with is not a classical mechanis-
tic reduction but, rather, an attempt to theorise how man relates to his body and the 
outside world as these are both objectified by the sciences. There is no doubt that for La 
Mettrie this is a mediated relation. For example, he writes how words and figures form 
in the brain all the marks by which we distinguish and recall objects: 
                                                     
 
 
11 M. De Kesel, "Emocratie als symptoom: een cartesiaanse causerie," in Ratio in een emotionele samenleving, ed. S. 
Hertmans (Gent: Hogeschool Gent, 2008). 
12 Ibid. 
13 J. Lacan, Le séminaire II: The ego in Freud’s theory in the technique of psychoanalysis 1954-1955: 31. 
14 C. T. Wolfe, "A happiness fit for organic bodies: La Mettrie‖s medical Epicureanism," in Epicureanism in the 
Enlightenment, ed. N. Leddy and A. Lifschitz (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation (forthcoming), 2009). 
15 C. U. M. Smith, "Synapses, Quantum Theory and Panpsychism," NeuroQuantology 6, no. 6 (2008). 
 These words and the figures they represent are so closely linked in the brain that 
it is quite rare for us to imagine an object without the name or sign attached to 
it.16  
La Mettrie‖s reduction of man to the realm of the material is almost a theory of lan-
guage; man as a symbolic machine. La Mettrie‖s key concept here is “imagination,” 
which he effectively equates with the soul. It is the imagination which represents, to it-
self, all the objects along with their names and symbols. 
It reasons, judges, penetrates, compares, and analyzes. Could it feel so well the 
beauty of the pictures that are drawn for it without understanding their relation-
ships? No. In the same way as it cannot fall back on the pleasures of the senses 
without appreciating all their perfection or sensuality [volupté]17, so it cannot re-
flect on what it has conceived mechanically without constituting judgement it-
self.18  
It is in this way that Lacan valued La Mettrie‖s idea that man, compared to the animals, 
is a machine. The symbolic, mediated, mathematized body is what, for Lacan, allows us, 
even as “something decomposed,” to possess greater freedom.19 As the quote from La 
Mettrie shows, this entails the adoption of the scientific gaze; man‖s presence with him-
self and the world is a business of analyzing, comparing, and investigating. But the ob-
jectification of the body is not unproblematic. As Hub Zwart puts it, scientific research 
leads to a loss of any sense of meaningful unity or Gestalt. In contrast to this systematic 
disclosure of bodily life, phenomenological understandings in the human sciences have 
tried to rescue and rehabilitate a more immediate and intimate experience of the body in 
the “life world.”20 But, isn’t this what La Mettrie is already is engaging with? Indeed, Ma-
chine Man seems to be one of the first important attempts to realize a phenomenological 
idealization of the body. This idealization is centred around La Mettrie’s idea of voluptu-
ousness.21 In the previous quotation it is clear that imagination leads to a sensual being in 
the world. La Mettrie’s voluptuousness is an attempt to give the decomposed subject of 
science back his wholeness, an attempt to realize that greater freedom of which Lacan 
spoke.  
                                                     
 
 
16 J. O. La Mettrie, Machine man and other writings: 14. 
17 It is to be noted that Ann Thomson in her translation of La Mettrie seems inclined to soften “la volupté” in 
translating it almost always as “sensuality.” 
18 J. O. La Mettrie, Machine man and other writings: 15. 
19 J. Lacan, Le séminaire II: The ego in Freud’s theory in the technique of psychoanalysis 1954-1955: 31. 
20 H. Zwart, "Medicine, symbolization and the “real” body—Lacan's understanding of medical science," 
Medicine, health care, and philosophy 1, no. 2 (1998): 107. 
21 “La Volupté” moreover is the title of another of La Mettrie‖s major works published in 1746. 
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Natania Meeker seems to be in accordance with this idea when she considers Ma-
chine Man as a pure figure; the constitution of the machine-man is fundamentally and 
formally as a trope.22 According to Meeker, La Mettrie is suggesting that, in order to un-
derstand our experience as fully materializable, we must begin by thinking figurally. 
Meeker thus considers the literary text as the site where La Mettrian machinic con-
straint dissolves into “a series of contingent pleasures, producing a subject that is at 
once textual, substantial, and autonomous.”23 Meeker holds that, particularly in his later 
writings, La Mettrie bears witness to a gradual movement away from natural philosophy 
and toward literature as the practical embodiment of his materialism.24 Meeker’s central 
idea is that the conception of matter as capable of reflexivity leads to the possibility of a 
textual, substantial, and autonomous subject, but this does not take into account that La 
Mettrie actually tried to get rid of the paradoxical Cartesian notion of reflexivity. As 
C.U.M. Smith puts it, Machine Man was a critique of the “to know that one knows” of 
Descartes’ cogito.25 For Lacan too, thinking is not, as such, reflexive. The existence of a 
thought does not presuppose that one thinks about the thought.26 The problem of the re-
flexive “to know that one knows” is that it presupposes that the primal knowing makes 
sense on its own, while the whole point of reflexivity is that this primal knowing is but a 
mythical, logical construction. There is no unmediated or natural way of knowing prior to 
reflexive knowing. Reflexivity is essentially circular. And is this circular reflexivity not 
brought into the open in modernity? Before the Enlightenment, God made man’s reflexive 
being in the world possible; with your name on his palm God knew your thoughts. In mo-
dernity, however, man himself had to carry the full weight of mediation. Initially, with the 
Cartesian cogito God still had a function. The cogito, as the agent outside of res extensa, 
still needed an ultimate reference point. God, although himself no longer part of the 
world, grounded this modern reflexivity which would otherwise continue in reductio ad 
infinitum (to know that one knows, that one knows, that one...). La Mettrie, however, did 
away both with Cartesian dualism and with the reference to God. With La Mettrie, the 
soul is integrated into the res extensa and God is replaced by a new Big Other in the form 
of Science; now it is Science which knows your thoughts. La Mettrie dismissed the Carte-
sian “to know that one knows” by positioning one undivided subject, grounded this time 
                                                     
 
 
22 N. Meeker, "'Flowers Strewn on the Way to Volupté': The Materialist Tropes of La Mettrie," The Eighteenth 
Century: Theory and Interpretation 48, no. 3 (2007). 
23 Ibid., 246. 
24 Ibid., 249. 
25 C. U. M. Smith, "Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751)," Journal of the history of the neurosciences 11, no. 2 
(2002): 120. 
26 J. Lacan, "Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Livre IX: L‖identification, 1961-1962," (1962). 
 in a (scientific informed) theory on voluptuousness; man is only driven by a pleasure prin-
ciple, man has a sensual principle as his guide.  
Contrary to Meeker‖s narrowing of La Mettrie to aesthetics and literature, it is clear 
that La Mettrie‖s endeavour to grasp modern man as “machine man” is inscribed in sci-
ence. In Machine Man he constantly draws upon science to argue that the cogito is part of 
res extensa, that man is a machine. His voluptuousness, his attempt to ground man‖s 
presence in the world, is, in turn, also informed by science. His hedonism is a medical, 
scientific hedonism. It is exactly this, as I will argue in the next section, which allows us 
to see La Mettrie‖s position as one close to perversion. Several authors have pointed out 
the connection between La Mettrie and Freud27 and, indeed, his conception of man as a 
pleasure automaton, seems very proto-Freudian. But it is also clear that La Mettrie is not 
able to surpass the paradoxes and the deadlocks of his voluptuous machine man. Main-
taining and promoting the un-problematic relation of man and his pleasure seeking 
body, engaging in a sort of scientific aesthetization, La Mettrie stops short of what Freud 
later called the “beyond the pleasure principle” and what Lacan reworked as the fun-
damental decentring effect of jouissance. For La Mettrie, man is striving for “organic, 
automatic or natural happiness”; natural because “our soul has nothing to do with it,”28 
organic because it “flows from our organisation.”29 Here La Mettrie comes close to La-
can‖s conceptualisation of jouissance as something with which the subject has nothing to 
do, and in which thus resides the ultimate automaton dimension. But La Mettrie‖s strug-
gle with and his denial of the zero-level of subjectivity, which his solution of Cartesian 
dualism entailed, led him to an attempt to devise a hedonism departing from a natural-
ized scientific discourse, and this means that, rather than prefiguring Freud or Lacan, it 
would be more accurate to see him as prefiguring the Marquis de Sade. 
The Pornographic Imagery of La Mettrie’s Medical Epicureanism  
La Mettrie does not side with Nature as such. His voluptuous machine man is surely not 
a man-animal. If there were an animal which would die of hunger in the middle of a riv-
                                                     
 
 
27 J. Domenech, L'éthique des Lumières: les fondements de la morale dans la philosophie française du XVIIIe siècle (Paris: 
Vrin, 1989); J. Falvey, ed. Julien Offray De La Mettrie. Discours sur le bonheur, Studies on Voltaire and the 
Eighteenth Century, 134 (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution, 1975); A. Vartanian, 
Science and Humanism in the French Enlightenment (Charlottesville, Va.: Rookwood Press, 1999). 
28 J. O. La Mettrie, Machine man and other writings: 244. 
29 Ibid., 240. 
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er of milk, La Mettrie writes, it would be man.30 La Mettrie acknowledges man‖s funda-
mental maladjustment to the natural environment; “put [man] with an animal on the 
edge of a cliff; only he will fall. He will drown while the other will swim away.”31 So, in 
contradiction with his claim for man‖s pursuit of “organic, automatic and natural hap-
piness,” La Mettrie‖s machine man has to be taken literally; man is an automaton, man is 
an “artificial intelligence,” robotically bumping into obstacles, responding awkwardly to 
subtle, natural cues. Is not this maladjustment, not only to nature but also to the human 
and social environment, an essential characteristic of modern man? Modern man is a 
Frankenstein monster who has to be taught how to be human. He needs to follow par-
enting courses, personality development, and stress coaching. His assessment of real life 
is something he gets from “reality TV.” We should not react with indignation or shock 
to claims such as “man is a computer,” for of course man resembles the computer, he 
devised it. The question is rather how we, as the parents of the machine, as Lacan puts 
it,32 came to build such an artefact resembling ourselves, which is to say, resembling our 
own zero-level of subjectivity? 
It is here, where La Mettrie argues that the human being differs fundamentally from 
the animal, that he comes up with his manifold examples from the sphere of sexuality. 
At the age of fourteen or fifteen he hardly glimpses the great pleasures that await 
him in the reproduction of his species; he is already an adolescent, but he does not 
know what to do in a game that nature teaches animals so quickly; he hides as if 
ashamed of feeling pleasure and of being created in order to be happy. 33 
Of course, psychoanalytically, La Mettrie is absolutely right in positing the difference 
between animal and man in sexual terms. Man, indeed, is not adapted to sexuality, but, 
in contrast to psychoanalytic views, La Mettrie believes that this maladjustment is not 
problematic, arguing that it can be surpassed by turning to a new kind of hedonism. 
Moreover, there is something to be said about the specific style of La Mettrie‖s exam-
ples. They are not to be reduced to the advice of the bon vivant to let go of one‖s shame 
and enjoy the pleasures of nature, rather La Mettrie makes his illustrations as lively and 
tangible as possible and relates them to sexuality wherever he can. It is here that the 
dimension of surplus jouissance comes in; the jouissance entailed in writing these exam-
ples and the jouissance they appear to aim to evoke in the readers. As Meeker claims, La 
Mettrie often deliberately evokes sexual desire and curiosity.34 Indeed, almost as though 
                                                     
 
 
30 Ibid., 18. 
31 Ibid., 18. 
32 J. Lacan, Le séminaire II: The ego in Freud’s theory in the technique of psychoanalysis 1954-1955: 31. 
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34 N. Meeker, "'Flowers Strewn on the Way to Volupté': The Materialist Tropes of La Mettrie," 252. 
 he has Tourette Syndrome, La Mettrie throws around sexual and obscene examples. For 
example, when he writes that it is impossible for an idea to emerge without passing 
through the senses, suddenly, out of the blue, he tells the story of a woman who had no 
vulva: 
It is as impossible to give a single idea to a man deprived of all the senses as to give 
a child to a woman in whom nature was absent-minded enough to forget to make 
a vulva, as I have seen in one who had neither opening nor vagina nor womb, as 
whose marriage was annulled for that reason after ten years.35 
Is La Mettrie not betting on the reaction; how did they do it for these ten years? In another 
example, mocking the idea of the sovereign soul, he writes: 
With such a despotic mistress, in whose hands lay, so to speak, the heartbeat and 
the laws of circulation, there is doubtless no fever, no pain, no repining and no 
shameful impotence or embarrassing uncontrollable erections.36 
Sure, the penis provides a valuable critique of the sovereign soul, but, as Machine Man 
abounds with these sexual examples, La Mettrie begins to appear like an exhibitionist, 
flashing his raincoat whenever he can. Is La Mettrie not deliberately evoking our arous-
al, embarrassment, or shame in order to convince us of his idea of the unified voluptu-
ous man? This is the stance of the pervert. In Lacanian terms, the exhibitionist seeks the 
reactions he gets because they are needed to prove to him that what he is displaying is 
in fact an object of jouissance. Of course, La Mettrie assumes the position of a man of sci-
ence who puts aside his reservations, having the scientific duty to enlighten the people, 
but do the manifold voluptuous examples not indicate that we have to understand this 
duty as having the structure of a perversion? Reducing oneself to an instrument of sci-
ence is strictly homologous to the position of the pervert. As Lacan states, the pervert 
occupies the place of the object for the benefit of another “for whose jouissance he ex-
ercises his action as sadistic pervert.”37 It is as if La Mettrie is saying, it is not my desire 
to voice all these obscenities, I am merely an instrument of science. Charles T. Wolfe 
thus rightly calls La Mettrie‖s reworking of Epicureanism a “medical Epicureanism,” 
bringing its hedonistic and materialistic overtones to the fore.38 La Metrie‖s materialism 
is not a materialism simpliciter, but rather a materialism of living matter “bolstered by a 
medical standpoint in which the ethical returns as ―organic, automatic happiness.‖”39 In 
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this way it is not La Mettrie himself but science, specifically medical science, which is 
the enunciator of the Epicurean advice and indictments.  
Do La Mettrie‖s elegies on Nature (“nature has created us all solely to be happy”) thus 
not lead to what in psychoanalysis is called the obscene superego command to enjoy, 
the imperative which really came to prominence with 20th century consumerism? Todd 
McGowan writes that, where former societies required subjects to renounce their pri-
vate enjoyment, today the only duty consists of enjoying oneself as much as possible.40 
Furthermore, this duty to enjoy seems to be at the core of today‖s psy-sciences, the true 
heirs of La Mettrie‖s medical Epicureanism. Daunton and Hilton write, “it is now some-
thing of a duty to explore personal identity through consumption.”41 Nike’s “Just Do 
It!”, which compels the subject, as Renata Salecl writes, to believe in itself as “free in the 
sense of being a non-believer in authority and a person capable of changing his/her identi-
ty at will,”42 could also be an assertiveness training course slogan.  
To be clear, La Mettrie was right in asserting something maladjusted or unnatural in 
man‖s dealing with jouissance. His conception of man as a machine is actually very close 
to the psychoanalytical notion of the jouissance-seeking drive as something machine-like. 
The drive, in Lacanian theory, is concerned with a “fetishization of a partial moment 
into an autonomous goal: the elevation of pleasure into jouissance.”43 Humans are not 
simply alive but are possessed by the strange drive to enjoy life in excess. This, for Žižek, 
shows that man is not reflexive, that the human stance is not a further "mediation" of 
animal activity but, on the contrary, that man perceives as a direct goal what for an an-
imal has no intrinsic value.44 Is this not the fundamental non-reflexivity which La 
Mettrie appears to stumble across? The paradox of La Mettrie is that it is exactly here 
that he introduces his medical Epicureanism and thus re-establishes reflexivity by im-
posing the scientific gaze. This is the paradox of, look at you, you’re nothing but a non-
reflexive machine man. La Mettrie‖s endeavour to establish a scientifically informed solu-
tion to man‖s fundamental maladjustment thus cannot but bounce back. If man is urged 
by a medical Epicureanism to enjoy being a machine-animal, then he can only do so in a 
perverted manner, he can only mimic or play at being the animal-machine driven by 
nature. The Marquis de Sade, in citing La Mettrie saying “Wallow in filth like pigs and 
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 you will be happy like pigs”45 reveals something of the perverse disposition of La Mettri-
an Epicureanism. In the next section, I‖ll explore this Sadean connection.  
From La Mettrie to Sade via Kant 
It is well known that Sade, in his writing, makes ample use of Enlightenment philoso-
phers. The question of whether “l‖aimable La Mettrie,” as Sade called him,46 was the di-
rect inspiration for Sade‖s infamous writings has been taken up by various commenta-
tors and most commonly answered in the negative. Ann Thomson, for example, con-
cludes that Sade transformed into injunctions what La Mettrie only clinically observed.47 
She goes on to argue that, where La Mettrie valued the rights of society to punish the 
antisocial individual, Sade entirely dismisses such rights. Thomson describes La 
Mettrie‖s position as a medical scientist assessing man‖s destructive passions, passions 
which the rational citizen would condemn.48 But what is the position from which La 
Mettrie views both man in the spell of his passions and man as the rational citizen rep-
resenting the rights of society? The neutrality of La Mettrie‖s clinical gaze is of course 
based on the supposition that Nature itself is neutral and amoral, this is what the neu-
tral scientist identifies with. But at a given moment La Mettrie admits his suspicion of a 
vicious nature “more at ease hobbling with pleasure, as if it would be violent to her or 
painful to walk straight.”49 Is there thus not something truly Sadean that becomes visi-
ble through the cracks of La Mettrie‖s clinical descriptions? For it was along very similar 
lines that Sade wrote that plagues, famines, and murders are not accidents but necessi-
ties of Nature's laws50 and that destruction is one of the chief laws of Nature.51 Sade lays 
bare the fact that La Mettrie‖s scientific aim to naturalize the machine-man presupposes 
some absolute, immoral agency of infinite Evil. 
Sade‖s appropriation of La Mettrie cannot, however, be properly understood without 
passing through Kant. In contrast to La Mettrie‖s recourse to Epicureanism, Immanuel 
Kant‖s endeavour was to ground ethics in a formal approach. He redefined the moral 
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Law taking as his departure point a zero-level of subjectivity, what Žižek calls the “sub-
stanceless void of the self-rotating abyssal vortex called ―transcendental appercep-
tion.‖”52 For, in order to be able to view rationality as absolutely free in the field of mo-
rality, Kant cut morality loose from the human passions, from any “pathological object,” 
from any particular “good.” The full weight of the moral Law lies with reason and not 
with “das Ding an sich.”53 In this anti-essentialist view where the Good is no longer a 
real and ontological reality which grounds morality, the Good can only be the effect of 
the moral law.54 Kant thus wanted to ground ethics not in the individual, pathological 
justifications of the good, but in the Law itself. For Kant, one should not act out of incli-
nation, but only out of duty. The task of philosophy then is to look, through a rational 
reflection on our freedom, at what obliges each of us to adopt a single principle of mu-
tual respect. As John Rajchman puts it, Kant surrenders egoism to natural psychology 
and thus frees morality. In this way morality can be separated from the field of empiri-
cal or technical knowledge.55  
And here we must take a bold step. It was exactly here that modern psychology came 
to light in the residue of the Kantian operation. In leaving morality and ethics to the 
Kantians, a pure empirical, technical, or natural psychology was believed to be possible. 
But this then necessarily raises the question of whether one can make a claim for a nat-
ural psychology which would be independent from or unaffected by the Kantian Law 
and, more exactly, by the Kantian zero-level of subjectivity? It is exactly this that psy-
choanalysis has always refuted. As Žižek writes: 
what Lacan does is to read the Freudian reference to the Copernican turn in the 
original Kantian sense, as asserting not the simple displacement of the centre 
from the ego to the id or the unconscious as the “true” substantial focus of the 
human psyche, but the transformation of the subject itself from the self-identical 
substantial ego, the psychological subject full of emotions, instincts, dispositions, 
etc., to what Lacan called the “barred subject ($),” the vortex of the self-relating 
negativity of desire. In this precise sense, the subject of the unconscious is none 
other than the Cartesian cogito.56 
Another way of phrasing this might be to say that the subject of psychoanalysis is the 
zero level of subjectivity. Psychoanalysis is not about replacing a natural psychology by 
a psychology of the unconscious. Rather psychoanalysis, at least in its Lacanian form, 
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 entails the de-centering of the very possibility of any (natural) psychology. A radical, 
non-psychological, zero-level thus thwarts the domain of so called natural psychology. 
This problematic is all the more visible with the empirical and technical approaches to 
psychology, which effectively amount to a de-psychologization. Contemporary psychol-
ogy often appears to be about genes, neurotransmitters, and cognitive and evolutionary 
mechanisms; essentially an evacuation of the psychic factor. As Nikolas Rose remarks, 
we have moved with ease from a psychological and humanistic ideal of self-fulfilment to 
a “somatic ethics.”57 Phrased otherwise, the denial of the radical non-psychological vor-
tex of modern subjectivity leads to the technical and empirical de-psychologized indi-
vidual of mainstream psychology. 
As, contra this shift, Lacanian psychoanalysis acknowledges and values the Kantian 
operation, it also questions the consequences and the paradoxes of thinking the moral 
Law from a zero-level of subjectivity. Where Kant posits a radical freedom emerging 
from rational thinking, psychoanalysis sees some other ghastly figures appearing. Is not 
one of the names for the domain of the zero-level of subjectivity, for example, the 
Freudian “death drive”? The death drive does not concern a Nirvana-like longing for 
self-annihilation. Rather, as Žižek points out, it stands for the opposite: “the way im-
mortality appears within psychoanalysis: for an uncanny excess of life, for an “undead” 
urge which persists beyond the (biological) cycle of life and death, of generation and 
corruption.”58 
We should recall here the recurrent theme in Sade‖s writings of the ethereal quasi-
immortal body of the victim which can be tortured indefinitely but nonetheless magi-
cally retains its beauty. For Žižek, Kant‖s "immortality of the soul" is effectively the im-
mortality of Sade‖s “undead” body.59 Thus we can see how the very domain in which 
Kant purports to ground his moral Law appears to be haunted by something which 
transcends the pathological Good and thus comes closer to ultimate Evil. Sade allows us 
to appreciate that the Kantian Law is grounded in something real; the real of a de-
subjectivizing jouissance. This is why Lacan saw Sade as the ultimate Kantian. As J. A. 
Miller puts it, Kant‖s “demands of duty” do not arise from nowhere, they are not no-
body‖s voice, they are the voice of the drives, that is, the voice of the sadistic superego.60 
So, while for Kant there is no "subject of the enunciation" of the moral Law (the moral 
Law is an impersonal command to do your duty), Sade renders the moral Law's enuncia-
tor visible in the figure of the “sadist,” the executioner-torturer, the agent who finds 
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pleasure in our (the moral subject's) pain and humiliation.61 Sade shows that the ulti-
mate potential of the Enlightenment lies in the realm of perversion and the infinite Evil. 
It is precisely this that is pre-figured in La Mettrie, but, while La Mettrie still sides with a 
classic epicurean and hedonistic understanding of the Good, it is only with Sade‖s ver-
sion of Kant‖s grounding of the Good in the Law that the full meaning of the modern 
bursts open. Kant‖s Moral Law was, in a way, an answer to La Mettrian materialism and 
its attempt to reinvent Epicureanism. Kant boldly formulated a modern transcendental 
solution to the question of the moral Law, an answer which, however, failed at a particu-
lar point. This is the breach that Sade tore open. In the following section we will turn to 
the question of whether all this does not, given the La Mettrian legacy, remain imprint-
ed on the general theories and the praxes of the human sciences right up to today.62 
The Perverse Core of Psychology 
As a starting point, it is useful to acknowledge that mainstream psychology always car-
ries some La Mettrian injunction to be happy and to enjoy life. Whether in a blunt or in 
more sophisticated form, the academic view on life is always either imposed or generat-
ed, from “science knows what is good for you” to “become your own psychologist and find it out 
yourself!” Paul Verhaeghe suggests in On Being Normal and Other Disorders,63 that psycholo-
gy haunts us with the image of “normal man,” but perhaps what we are haunted by 
foremost is Psychological Man, with all his pathological peculiarities and motivations 
charted by the psy-sciences. Our fear is not so much, am I normal enough? But, more 
than this, do I have all these peculiar characteristics and desires? Modern man is thus 
always prompted to measure the extent to which he fits these patho-psychological con-
structs of the psy-sciences. And does this not lay bare the non-psychological core of sub-
jectivity? Because the position from which the questions are asked inevitably escapes 
psychology, it is there that modern man experiences his being reduced to the pure gaze. 
But (pop)psychology, in disregarding the non-psychological core of subjectivity, is mer-
ciless in its message; this is what you are, this is what you can be, here are the scripts for 
living. Positive thinking, for example—again, in its popular but also in its more sophisti-
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 cated academic forms—boils down to you can fool yourself, you can fool nature. This is the 
Chestertonian solution of duping the Other, albeit using the prescriptions of psycholo-
gy. One of the most distinctive examples of this mechanism concerns sex education at 
puberty, often our first encounter with psy-theory. In what we might understand as a 
truly late-modern rite of passage, the adolescents are scientifically initiated in the theo-
ries of how puberty will affect their emotions, thoughts, and behaviour.64 This process 
of instructing the youth on youth has its illustrious predecessors. Frank Vande Veire 
writes that German fascism systematically tried to “intimidate the youth with (the belief 
in) the Youth,” precisely by naturalizing youth and sexuality.65 If, however, adolescence 
is also the place where these naturalized forces seem to run amok—in, for example, 
meaningless violence, incomprehensible suicides—are we not here receiving back the 
truth of the very scripts we have bombarded them with, as if, in a Sadean way, we have 
pushed the youth into a passivity which they can only escape in violent ways, a passivity 
which is, ultimately, our own. 
Another very strictly scripted discourse with well-defined roles is that of our con-
temporary victim-culture.66 Is the central discursive scheme here not that of the "expert 
victim"? The subject is confined in a passive position through the precise manner in 
which his or her being subjected to the events of life is redefined by the psy-disciplines 
into a strict script of victimhood. A way to escape this blockage of the subjective space is 
exactly to become the expert of one‖s own status as victim. This is one way we might 
understand the cases of people who seem to define the very essence of their being 
through the diagnosis of, for example, ADHD, Asperger‖s or the like. This can be under-
stood in line with Adorno‖s idea of mimicry; the victim identifies with the aggressor. 
The “expert victim” presents himself as the ultimate embodiment of psychological the-
ory by taking on the role of the proto-psychologist. Intimidation leads to self-
intimidation. Through mimicry, the terrorised subject chooses self-disciplination, as 
Vande Veire puts it, reducing himself to an instrument of an order which supersedes 
him.67 Through an incorporation of and into the always ready-to-hand psychological 
discourse, the subject assumes what psychoanalysis would understand as the position of 
the pervert.  
And are not the psychologist and psychotherapist also marked by the perverse core 
of psychology? Think, for example, of the psy-practitioner, who considers pain, on their 
own side or that of the patient, as the marker of therapeutic progress. Furthermore, this 
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should remind us of how for Kant the ethical experience is fundamentally linked to 
pain, because of man‖s hurt pride vis-à-vis the injunction of the moral Law.68 Is the ther-
apist not then someone who loves the bitterness of this duty which lifts him high above 
any vulgar self-interest? This is, of course, the classic definition of the sadist-torturer as 
revealed in Hannah Arendt‖s work.69 Or perhaps this image of the therapist is outdated. 
Today, therapy has become more of a scientific and empirical practice. The therapist 
does not have to pay with his own person, rather, he uses scientifically validated meth-
ods which he applies as a scientist, probing and analysing the whole process. Which is to 
say that we are back with the sadistic position: the enjoyment of being a mere instru-
ment of a higher order. The psy-practioner simply follows the manual, minimizing his 
or her personal involvement, in a manner not dissimilar to fascist torturers in Pasolini‖s 
Salo who live by forcing the others to stage life.  
Are not, however, the academic and more theoretical approaches to psychology far 
removed from this picture? That is to say, can one really speak of such of a strong herit-
age of 18th century materialism? For Sam Whimster it is clear that cognitive psychology, 
evolutionary psychology, behaviour ecology, and evolutionary game theory all follow 
the La Mettrian stance in assuming that individuals and social outcomes are shaped by 
material causes beyond our immediate direct control.70 Also Churchland and Church-
land locate La Mettrie in the row between Darwin, Helmholtz, and Hebb, a row which 
can be seen as constituting the tradition which is still the guiding framework for most 
neuroscientists and physiological psychologists.71 Of course, today‖s materialism is not, 
as Mathieu Aury and Charles Wolfe argue, the straightforward, direct heir of the mate-
rialism of La Mettrie and others. Where 18th century materialism was metaphysical, to-
day‖s materialism renounces every speculation on the origin of matter. And if early ma-
terialism could be seen as a reductionism to what later came to be called biology, con-
temporary materialism departs from the reduction to physics.72 These restrictions aside, 
Aury and Wolfe conclude that today‖s materialism, insofar as it assumes as already es-
tablished a clear ontology and thus a causal closure of the spatial-temporal world (for 
example, in the case of brain-imaging), does rest on the shoulders of the materialistic 
philosophers of the Enlightenment. Sympathetic to today‖s neuro-cognitivistic ap-
proaches, Aury and Wolfe dismiss the accusation of “vulgar materialism,” traditionally 
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 associated with Carl Vogt (who proclaimed that thought is the secretion of the brain just 
as the liver secretes bile). In contrast, they promote an “intelligent materialism” which 
would recognize that the brain is also the secretion of thought. Here Aury and Wolfe 
refer to Gilles Châtelet for whom symbolic practices are not a cultural environment into 
which the brain is immersed, but rather, he considered the plasticity proper to symbolic 
practices as something which can be articulated via the plasticity of the brain. Is this 
not, once again, an instance of the La Mettrian stance? That is, is it not another instance 
of a relentless and structurally endless attempt to draw everything from the cogito into 
the rex extensa, denying, in the process, the problematic foundation of a zero-level of 
subjectivity? Could we not understand Châtelet as saying that the contingency of sym-
bolic practices can be reduced to contingent brain-processes, or, if we do not quite un-
derstand the impact of symbolic practices, let us nevertheless presuppose their organic 
base and reduce them to brain-processes which we equally do not yet fully understand.  
Today‖s materialistic discourses seem to be very effective in establishing hegemonic 
explanatory schemes which are so powerful that it is difficult to bring their paradoxes 
to light. Aury and Wolfe briefly assess these power effects—albeit without really ques-
tioning them—as they remark on how science has evolved from the domain of “contra-
power” to the domain of power. That is to say, while science first ran counter to the 
dominant religious discourse, it consequently became itself the dominant perspective: 
what was forbidden became mainstream. For Aury and Wolfe this is not problematic, as 
they write: 
This does not mean that the reductionist explanations which are at the heart of 
materialism should today be refused because they would be politically suspect, 
nor that one should naively oppose the “alienated” universe of science with a 
supposedly more authentic universe. It simply means that materialism does not 
have any foundations [le matérialisme est sans fondements].73 
But, are Aury and Wolfe not too optimistic? Perhaps the central question here is that of 
whether today‖s psy-sciences are up to the task to realise this materialism without founda-
tions, a materialism which also then renounces any final cause? Of course, today‖s scien-
tism should not be contested from a starting point of any conception of authenticity. 
Authenticity is what leads directly to a Blut und Bodem ideology and it is, furthermore, 
always stated from a perspective which rests on a (para)theoretical conceptualization of 
“real and natural man/society.” Is not, however, one of the dangers in advanced and 
sophisticated neuropsychological research that it itself assumes a (para)theoretical view 
on man or society? The neuro-imaging of aggression, for example, cannot but lean on 
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(psychological) theories or essentialist and naturalized views of what aggression is and 
where it comes from. That is to say, the triggers used in so-called event-related fMRI 
(functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging74) are never theoretically neutral. If one wants 
to register and compare neural responses to stories, photographs, or video-fragments, 
these prompts cannot but be in some way informed by an explicit or implicit psycholog-
ical theory on what one wants to research. In brain imaging the tautological circle of 
neurology-psychology-neurology always lurks. It is, therefore, up to the neurosciences 
to realize a true materialism without foundations, which would mean acknowledging a 
zero-level of authenticity, acknowledging the pure void of being which has been left 
behind as the Cartesian cogito was drawn into La Mettrian materialism.  
We should, furthermore, not be blinded by the academic dismissal of direct ontologi-
cal questions or statements. Turning to real existing Academia, it is clear that in large in-
stitutional practices within the psy-sciences fundamental pre-Kantian assumptions 
structure everyday praxis. Take for example the whole ADHD issue, where, as exempli-
fied in the “European clinical guidelines for hyperkinetic disorder,”75 the true nature of 
behaviour is considered to be synaptical and biochemical. But does this influential arti-
cle not reveal something essential in its shameless and misleading use of the word Euro-
pean? The signifier “European” gives the article the aura of an official document whose 
implementation is mandatory, while it should be clear, European here stands for Europe-
an Network for Hyperkinetic Disorders and not for some official organ of the European 
Community! Does it not become patently visible here how certain academic practices 
position themselves as discourses of power? If there is any heritage of La Mettrie here, it 
is in the discipline‖s claim that it is science, not the law or politics, which should provide 
the binding guidelines. Maybe the “vulgar” in today‖s vulgar materialism is the uncondi-
tional belief that science is the discourse which engenders an anonymous “subject sup-
posed to know” with the mandate to bypass democracy and politics.  
Conclusions 
Is the La Mettrian-Sadean heritage then inescapable? Is Sade nothing more than the 
truth of Kant? As Žižek puts it, maybe Sade is not the entire truth of Kantian ethics, but 
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 more a form of its perverted realization. If the moral law can simply be translated into 
the Freudian superego, then Kant effectively equals Sade. But if, as Lacan shows, the 
moral law is equivalent to desire, then Sade articulates what happens when the subject 
betrays the true stringency of Kantian ethics. The superego feeds on the subject‖s com-
promising on his desire. Žižek understands this point politically: 
“Sade as the truth of Kant” would mean that Kantian ethics effectively harbors to-
talitarian potentials; however, insofar as we conceive of Kantian ethics as precise-
ly prohibiting the subject to assume the position of the object-instrument of Oth-
er's jouissance, i.e. to calling on him to assume full responsibility for what he pro-
claims his Duty, then Kant is the antitotalitarian par excellence.76 
In attempting to conceive this responsibility, Žižek describes two traps. The first is Sar-
tre‖s mauvaise foi, (bad faith), which renders the Sartrean subject responsible for his ex-
istential project and, as such, burdens him with the ontological guilt inherent in human 
existence.77 The second trap is shifting the blame onto the Other; e.g., it is my uncon-
scious, not me.78 The latter trap is, of course, that of the La Mettrian naturalization-
psychologization which today most often appears in the form, it is my genes, not me, a 
move which produces that mysterious me every positive characteristic of which can, 
again, be naturalized and drawn into the res extensa. For Žižek, Kant‖s duty “beyond the 
good” offers a way out because the Kantian moral law does not say what I have to do, 
only that I have to do my duty. It is the responsibility of the subject itself to translate 
this abstract injunction. Thus, central to Kantian ethics is the prohibition against adopt-
ing the position of the pure instrument of the big Other‖s Will, while, at the same time, 
this is exactly what generates the obscene jouissance of conceiving of oneself as excul-
pated for what one is doing.79 The equivalence of the Kantian Law and Lacan‖s desire also 
means that the latter is inextricably linked to the zero-level of subjectivity which was 
brought to us with Cartesian modernity. Lacanian desire is thus not on the side of what 
Kant calls the pathological and egoistic aspirations of the subject. Desire is not some-
thing psychological, as it is essentially not a relation to an object but rather a relation to 
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a pure lack in Being. Desire, thus, is another name for the way subjectivity is generated 
from a zero-level. Žižek calls this Lacan‖s critique of pure desire. If, for Kant, desire is 
pathological, since there is no a priori link between an empirical object and the pleasure 
it generates for the subject, then Lacan claims that desire does have a non-pathological, 
a priori object, namely objet petit a.80 Objet a is the Lacanian notation of the object-cause 
of desire, in the sense that objet a is not the object towards which desire tends, but ra-
ther the cause of desire. In this way it functions as an embodiment of lack, a positivised 
loss, and is something detached from the La Mettrian body-machine. In Lacanian terms, 
it is its bodily remainder.  
Thus, desire, as it arises from its zero level objet a, is the result of the Cartesian cogito 
being drawn into the res extensa. In this way it is clear that objet a, situated as it is at the 
zero-level of subjectivity, stands for that which thwarts the whole stance of science. In 
other words, the problem of subjectivity is situated at the structural and problematic 
border of science. It is there that psychology tries to play the role of the keystone of Ac-
ademia, trying to get a grip on subjectivity. But is the problem not then that mainstream 
psychology, instead of positioning itself exactly on the border or the breach of science, 
rather aspires to be an integral part of science? And it is here that it goes astray. In re-
peating the La Mettrian stance of reducing everything to the res extensa and denying the 
non-psychological zero level of subjectivity thus created, psychology results in a de-
psychologizing and de-subjectivizing stance. This is where mainstream psychology 
threatens to engage in practices which must be understood as belonging to a perverse 
structure. Modern science, as such, is not structurally perverse. It is at its border, with 
the problem of subjectivity, that a perverse position is realized. Today, it seems that the 
very name for that realization is psychology.  
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